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The ‘Marriage Game’: An assignment problem with indivisibilities

✍ Scribed by Peter J. Dolton

Publisher
Springer US
Year
1982
Tongue
English
Weight
639 KB
Volume
14
Category
Article
ISSN
0040-5833

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