The Janus-face of philosophy of biology
β Scribed by Patricia Williams
- Publisher
- Springer Netherlands
- Year
- 1991
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 652 KB
- Volume
- 6
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0169-3867
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
β¦ Synopsis
Philosophy of biology, unlike philosophy of physics and philosophy of science generally, is Janus-faced. Like philosophy of physics, it looks at logical and conceptual issues in its chosen discipline. And like philosophy of science generally, it investigates scientific methodology and logic. However, it also uses its chosen discipline to scrutinize philosophical issues. This comes about because biology seems to have something to tell us about human nature, and philosophical theories frequently depend on some concept of human nature. Both of these faces of philosophy of biology are represented in this collection of essays, essays which are printed here for the first time.
More is represented here as well, for two biologists contribute to the volume, one speaking directly to philosophers about the relevance of their discipline to his and of how that relevance can be increased. This is a complex, interesting collection, written for professionals in the fields of both biology and philosophy. The volume does not have a single focus, and if the reader comes away with a single impression, it is that philosophy of biology is extremely varied and complex.
The volume comes with an informative introduction. I will not repeat what is said there, but instead will note the problem each essay addresses as well as each essay's conclusion, then make critical comments where appropriate. The collection can be divided into two parts, coincident with the Janus faces of philosophy of biology. I will move from the essays on human nature to those dealing with logical and conceptual issues in biology. But first, one correction to the introduction.
The discussion of Immanuel Kant and Peter Singer on pages 11-12 is not accurate. Kant does not abstract away from our desires in his ethics, although Singer does; Kant eschews desires, even benevolent ones, as a basis for ethics , pp. 66-67). Singer (1981, pp. 3-53) holds that reason operates on our evolved, altruistic motives, not on our evolved selfish ones, to yield a universal morality. The problem of ethics, as he
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