The iterated continuous prisoner's dilemma game cannot explain the evolution of interspecific mutualism in unstructured populations

Evolution of Strategies in the three-per

Evolution of Strategies in the three-person Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Game

✍ Masanao Matsushima; Takashi Ikegami 📂 Article 📅 1998 🏛 Elsevier Science 🌐 English ⚖ 287 KB

A three-person iterated prisoner's dilemma (3p-IPD) game is studied. The present simulation uses a lattice model of finite state automata. In particular, the similarity between a noisy 2pand a noiseless 3p-IPD game is discussed. It is known that, due to the noise, Tit for Tat loses its robustness an