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The intensity of incentives in firms and markets: Moral hazard with envious agents

✍ Scribed by Björn Bartling; Ferdinand A. von Siemens

Book ID: 116714518
Publisher: Elsevier Science
Year: 2010
Tongue: English
Weight: 306 KB
Volume: 17
Category: Article
ISSN: 0927-5371
DOI: 10.1016/j.labeco.2009.10.002

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

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