This paper explores the variations among local governments in the composition of tax revenues, or more specifically, in the relative use of property taxes. Using a median voter framework, various hypotheses are developed concerning the factors that should influence the relative use of property taxes
The incentive effects of property taxes on local governments
โ Scribed by Edward L. Glaeser
- Publisher
- Springer US
- Year
- 1996
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 1007 KB
- Volume
- 89
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0048-5829
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
โฆ Synopsis
This paper applies the ideas of Brennan and Buchanan (1977, 1978, 1980) to local property taxes. When local governments maximize their revenues, property taxes provide incentives for adequate amenity provision. Local amenity provision determines property values which then determine local tax revenues. As long as the demand for housing is inelastic, property-taxes will provide stronger incentives for local governments than lump-sum taxes. As current property values reflect expectations about future amenity levels, property taxes create incentives for even the most myopic government to invest for the future. Local property taxes can also act to limit the incentives of localities to tax; there are cases where higher levels of local property taxes lead to lower overall tax burdens. These ideas are applied to the tax reform in the late 1970s, one reason that tax reform may have been so successful is that in a period where land prices are driven by many forces other than government amenities, property taxes lose their value as incentive devices.
๐ SIMILAR VOLUMES
The purpose of this paper is to explore the effect of the elasticity of the tax structure on the amount of spending by state government. While the empirical analysis centers on state government spending, the underlying theory may be generalized to any government unit.