The Zeuthen bargaining model occupies a prominent place among those theories of the bargaining process that have been formulated and expounded by economists. Its solution to the bargaining problem is essentially economic, since invariant utility functions based on economic factors alone determine th
β¦ LIBER β¦
The generalized Nash bargaining solution and Incentive Compatible Mechanisms
β Scribed by F. Weidner
- Publisher
- Springer-Verlag
- Year
- 1992
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 845 KB
- Volume
- 21
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0020-7276
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
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