One of the more basic distinctions usually drawn in metaethics is between formalist (deontological) and consequentialist (teleological) systems of moral reasoning. Andrew Oldenquist has recently argued that there is no difference between these two types of system, and that each is therefore trivial. (See his 'Choosing, Deciding, and Doing', in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by Paul Edwards, II,[96][97][98][99][100][101][102][103][104] Mind LXXV,[180][181][182][183][184][185][186][187][188][189][190][191][192] I intend here to examine and reinstate that distinction through an analysis of the act-consequence distinction.
I employ, with Oldenquist, the definitions of formalism and consequentialism proposed by C. D. Broad Deontological theories hold that there are ethical propositions of the form: "'Such and such a kind of action would always be right (or wrong) in such and such circumstances, no matter what its consequences might be" .... Teleological theories hold that the rightness or wrongness of an action is always determined by its tendency to produce certain consequences which are intrinsically good or bad (Five Types of Ethical Theory, p. 207).
Systems may differ in what characteristics they deem morally relevant, but that does not matter for the present discussion. Though the definitions are imprecise, they highlight the conceptual ground for the distinction between formalism and consequentialism: the distinction holds only if there is a nonarbitrary ground for distinguishing an act from at least some consequences of that act. Oldenquist claims that there is no such non-arbitrary ground and concludes to the triviality of the formalism-consequentialism distinction. I will show first why he regards the act-consequence distinction as arbitrary and why it follows that the formalism-consequentialism distinction is trivial. I shall then argue for the non-arbitrariness of the act-consequence distinction in specific kinds of cases in order to reinstate the formalism-consequentialism distinction.
Elizabeth Anscombe has shown that a single chain of events is often