## Abstract Although in its infancy, organized screening for colorectal cancer (CRC) in the general population is increasing at regional and national levels. Documenting and describing these initiatives is critical to identifying, sharing and promoting best practice in the delivery of CRC screening
The Formal Independence of Regulators: A Comparison of 17 Countries and 7 Sectors
β Scribed by Fabrizio Gilardi
- Publisher
- Swiss Political Science Association
- Year
- 2005
- Tongue
- German
- Weight
- 726 KB
- Volume
- 11
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 1420-3529
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
β¦ Synopsis
This article seeks to explain the pattern of delegation to independent regulatory agencies in Western Europe. Two types of arguments are advanced to explain variations in the formal independence of regulators. Firstly, the need for governments to increase their credible commitment capacity may lead them to delegate regulation to an agency that is partly beyond their direct control. Secondly, delegation may be a response to the political uncertainty problem, which arises when governments are afraid of being replaced by another coalition with different preferences, which could decide to change existing policy choices. In addition, veto players may constitute a functional equivalent of delegation, since they influence policy stability and therefore tend to mitigate both the credibility and the political uncertainty problems. These arguments are consistent with the results of the empirical analysis of the formal independence of regulators in seventeen countries and seven sectors.
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