How can we account for the fact that seemingly good rights often fail to establish the morally correct course of action, all things considered? In a recent article in this journal, W. A. Parent 1 argues, in the context of a critque of Judith Jarvis Thomson's work on rights, that the full specification of any abstract right includes a limiting qualifier such as "in so far as is in accord with the demands of justice'. In contrast to this 'moral specification' approach, which emphasizes the inherent limits on the range of rights, I shall argue for an 'override' explanation, which emphasizes limits on the force of rights.
1. CONFLICTS OF RIGHTS
Let us begin with Parent's restatement of Thomson's self-defense example.
Suppose aggressor A has got hold of a tank. He has told victim V that once in possession of this he will run V down. V now sees A get into the tank and head in his direction. It is open country with no place to hide. Luckily though, V happens to have an anti-tank gun which he can use to blow up the tank, thereby killing A but saving himself. (405)
If A and V have the 'same' right to life, how are we to explain our judgement that A is trying to murder V (a violation of V's right to life) but that V acts in justified self-defense (and does not violate A's right to life)? Agreeing with Parent (and Thomson) that there are insurmountable difficulties with forfeiture explanations, we are left with a choice between moral specification and override. (pp. 412-413) An override explanation in this case might run as follows. Either V or A must die at the hands of the other. A is responsible for creating the situation, while V is responsible, if at all, only for failing to prevent A from getting the tank. At least two standard rules of moral economy, the protection of innocents and the omission-commision distinction, suggest giving preference to A's right to life. Therefore, A's right overrides the competing claims of V's right.