The European Union's debt question: A conceptional viewpoint

✍ Scribed by Charles B. Blankart

• Publisher: Springer US
• Year: 1996
• Tongue: English
• Weight: 595 KB
• Volume: 7
• Category: Article
• ISSN: 1043-4062
• DOI: 10.1007/bf00119266

✦ Synopsis

The state can be conceived as an organization to protect personal freedom and to provide public goods. Consequently, we expect a constitution to consist of two different sets of rules; rules on personal freedom and rules for making collective decisions on public goods (mostly budgetary rules). The constitution of the European Union as laid down in the treaty of Maastricht (1992) provides both types of rules, but the emphasis is mainly on the former rules. This paper investigates budgetary rules, in particular the welfare economic logic of deficit spending.