The design of a secure and fair sealed-bid auction service
โ Scribed by Wen-Shenq Juang; Horng-Twu Liaw; Po-Chou Lin; Chi-Kai Lin
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 2005
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 970 KB
- Volume
- 41
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0895-7177
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
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