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Jesse Kalin's searching criticism 1 of the version of contractualism put forward in my The Grounds of Moral Judgement 2 calls for a reply. In this paper I limit myself to rebutting Kalin's arguments. A full scale defense of contractualism would be much more ambitious, may not be possible and is not attempted.
I argued that the contract ground, i.e. the proposition that It is in the interest of every member of some group S to make a contract with every'other member to do actions of some class X 3 strictly implies that members of that group have an abstract obligation to do actions of that class and a reason to do actions of that class (the notion of abstract obligation is a development of Ross's notion of a prima facie obligation).
1. THE BOWLING CLUB CASE
Kalin presents an apparent counter example. The members of a bowling club have made an actual ~agreement to meet at 8.00 on Thursdays. Since the agreement was made, circumstances have changed in such ways that it would be more convenient for every member of the club to meet at 7.30. In these circumstances, Kalin holds, it is the case that it is in the interest of every member of the club to make a contract to meet at 7.30, but it is not the case that there is an abstract obligation to meet at 7.30: the only obligation upon them is that generated by the actual agreement to meet at 8.00. Equally, it is not the case that there is a reason for the individuals to turn up at 7.30 although there is a reason for them to turn up at 8.00. This looks like a knock down refutation of contractualism at one stroke. Kalin adds that it makes no difference if each member is aware that it would be more convenient for everyone to meet at 7.30. This is true: the only dif-