The complexity of CTBT verification. Taking noble gas monitoring as an example

✍ Scribed by Martin B. Kalinowski; Andreas Becker; Paul R. J. Saey; Matthias P. Tuma; Gerhard Wotawa

• Book ID: 102811387
• Publisher: John Wiley and Sons
• Year: 2008
• Tongue: English
• Weight: 608 KB
• Volume: 14
• Category: Article
• ISSN: 1076-2787
• DOI: 10.1002/cplx.20228

✦ Synopsis

Abstract

Verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear‐Test‐Ban Treaty is a complex undertaking. A monitoring system comprising a global network of 321 seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound and radionuclide stations is used to detect signals that could indicate a possible nuclear explosion. This system daily sends more than 10 GB of raw data to the Vienna based International Data Centre for further processing and analysis to answer a simple question: have any indications for a possible nuclear explosion been sensed? We will focus on the 40 stations in charge for global radioxenon monitoring and discuss the complexity of solving the nuclear source attribution problem. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Complexity, 2008.