The bakers of Washington cartel: Twenty-five years later

✍ Scribed by Willard F. Mueller; Russell C. Parker

• Publisher: Springer US
• Year: 1992
• Tongue: English
• Weight: 588 KB
• Volume: 7
• Category: Article
• ISSN: 0889-938X
• DOI: 10.1007/bf00354848

✦ Synopsis

Craig M. Newmark challenges the findings of a 1965 Federal Trade Commission decision and Economic Report that a price fixing cartel increased bread prices in the state of Washington from the mid-1950s to 1964. Newmark believes prices were higher during the cartel's existence because retailers in the west had higher margins and that bakers in the west had higher wages and higher 'normal' profits than elsewhere in the country. Newmark ignores evidence that the cartel had set the higher retailer margins in Washington and that the labor costs and profits of Washington bakers were not higher than elsewhere. The Washington bakers had inflated distribution costs and excess capacity prior to the cartel's breakup. This result is commonplace when a cartel stimulates costly nonprice competition, so that the higher prices of the cartel members end up primarily in higher unit cost. Finally, Newmark claims that the reason prices fell in 1965 was the entry of a significant size price cutter, not the demise of the cartel. What Newmark characterized as a 'principal' entrant was actually a tiny, two-man operation, with less than a 1.0 percent market share. The record shows that this entrant did not trigger the precipitous price decline occuring when the cartel was destroyed.