✍ Scribed by Hector -Neri Castañeda
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
Some time ago I defended the view that the relationship between consciousness of one's own experiences or states of consciousness to consciousness of others' experiences or mental states resembles the connection between observational knowledge and the knowledge of theoretical entities built upon it. 1 1 was led to this view by the difficulties of the analogical-argument view about knowledge of other minds, and, I suppose, by my inability to get rid of the belief that I have direct and incorrigible access to my own experiences and states of consciousness. 2 I was influenced by Wilfrid Sellars" realistic conception of scientific theories and by his work on the philosophy of mind. I have yet found no telling reason to abandon that view. But it, like any other theory, must be tested and probed further.
Recently 3 Gary Young has developed what he thinks "is a conclusive objection to it [my view]. ''4 1 propose to show here that his objection not only is far from conclusive, but provides a test that the view passes with flying colors. To show this requires a discussion both of the acceptance of scientific theories and of an empirical assumption of philosophical analysis.
Young's paper falls into three parts: an exposition of Sellars' view, an exposition of my view, and a criticism of the latter. His first two parts are carefully done and his contrast between the two views is helpful. Indeed, I am very happy to say, which I cannot say of other discussions of my views, that Young's exegesis is admirable for his patience and his attempt at a fair exposition. My only substantial disagreement with him pertains to his critical section. It seems to assume a questionable view about the acceptance of scientific theories; it also leaves out of consideration an important part of my view, so that he does not see the great predictive power of the "theory" of other minds. I proceed to explain this in detail.
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