Team Discretion, Team Pay Dispersion and Team Efficiency

✍ Scribed by Chang-zheng Zhang; Huai-zu Li

• Book ID: 104453315
• Publisher: Elsevier
• Year: 2007
• Weight: 127 KB
• Volume: 27
• Category: Article
• ISSN: 1874-8651
• DOI: 10.1016/s1874-8651(08)60041-1

✦ Synopsis

The traditional team tournament model needs too rigorous assumptions which cannot reflect the different features of organizational structure and management style. The new model introduces team discretion into the traditional model and proposes expected utility function of team efficiency. Next, non-linear programming method is adopted to analyze the relationship among team discretion, team pay dispersion and team efficiency. The results show that team discretion can improve team pay dispersion, and there is an inverse U-shaped relationship between team discretion and team efficiency, and the most important fact is that larger team pay dispersion can prompt the positive effect of team discretion on team efficiency.