Taxation and market power when products are durable
โ Scribed by Gregory E. Goering; John R. Boyce
- Publisher
- Springer US
- Year
- 1996
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 744 KB
- Volume
- 9
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0922-680X
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
โฆ Synopsis
Empirical studies suggest that industries hardest hit by government regulations, such as pollution regulations, are both highly concentrated and manufacture durable products. We analyze a two-period durable goods monopoly model where the firm faces government restrictions in the form of pollution or excise taxes. In contrast to non-durable monopolistic industries, we show that taxes on pollution or an excise tax on output may increase a durable goods monopolist's commitment ability and market power. Indeed, any policy which restricts future output may have the perverse effect of increasing a monopolist's bargaining power with buyers and enhance their profits.
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