Scientific theories are complex entities. So are philosophical theories about scientific theories. Our article was meant to reduce complexity by dispensing with two philosophical theories, the received view (RV) and the semantic view (SV). Both views involve a heavy formal equipment which may not really help us to understand the empirical business of scientists.
We have hinted at an alternative strategy: full-fledged reconstructions of empirical statements defended by scientists themselves and presuppositions of such satements. No alternative "model" for scientific theories in general was elaborated. We distrust general models, as they tend to be like sand-castles. Perhaps scientific theories are so diverse that a single model cannot accomodate them all. And, importantly, philosophical models have a tendency to blind us. They may make us overlook the aspects of scientific research that do not fit the model we happen to work with. Of course, the burden of proving that our own approach is really viable is still ours. An additional paper would be needed to fully articulate any alternative to the RV-SV spectrum.
Meanwhile, we believe that our criticism of RV and SV is unharmed by Lloyd's, Beatty's and Thompson's critical comments. We will argue that their objections do not really strengthen their defense of the SV.
We have but a brief comment on Lloyd's reaction. She hardly discusses our paper, she just argues that we have misunderstood her population genetics paper, which was apparently meant as an introduction to a new research program rather than a defense of the SV. Lloyd kindly let us see unpublished materials showing that she has some exciting ideas in store for us. Her present comments are in fact a preview of these ideas. Naturally this is not the place to criticise them.
Beatty's first point is that the RV cannot make much sense of evolutionary theory if it rigidly demands that theories contain laws of nature. Perhaps he is right, but that does not prove much. RV theorists have defended many theses. So have SV theorists. If RV theorists are wrong about laws, it does not follow at all that the RV must be rejected, lock, stock and barrel.
In our initial characterization of the RV and the SV we have concentrated on another issue which we regard as more important, viz., the relations between syntax, semantics and empirical content. Our objection Biology and Philosophy 2 (1987) 33-41.