In "Suicide and False Desires," Robert M. Martin takes an Epicurean turn, in the philosophical, not popular, sense, and argues that we should not interfere with a suicide, "in even those cases in which the desire for death is a false one, ''1 because if he is successful, he will not exist, and thus will not have any desires to be frustrated. Although I have no objection in principle to suicide, and agree with much of his view, I want to criticize his argument and conclusion.
Martin grants that there are some occasions when "ill or irrational people ought, for their own good, to be prevented from doing what they think they want to, ''2 but it is "inappropriate to treat suicidal desires in particular this way. ''3 This seems prima facie odd, since one might suppose that suicide, being final, unless there is a future life, is one area where one especially ought to prevent ill or irrational people from doing what they think they want to do; this would seem to be arguably true also of the sane, about whom Martin is mainly concerned.
Martin lists four legitimate senses in which we may be said to have false desires. (1) Mistaken or incomplete information about the object desired. A woman wants fame, finds it has its own problems, and says that she didn't really want to be famous after all. (2) False or incomplete information about circumstances. A man mistakenly thinks that a tidal wave will flood his home town, sells his house, quits his job, and then regrets his decision. (3) False or incomplete information about alternatives. A girl thinks that she can best get a good grade from her instructor by bribing him, but finds out that some studying would have resulted in better grades. (4) A false desire in the sense of a fleeting and not representative desire. A man quits his job because of a sudden desire, and later regrets his rash action.
Martin argues that a desire to kill oneself might be a false desire in any of these senses. He quotes Louise Horowitz, who argues that we can distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate suicides and argues that we inform a would-be suicide of alternative actions; the would-be suicide then need not defend his decision, but need only discuss it, to avoid making a mistake.
Martin agrees with Horowitz's account in regard to non-suicide cases, but thinks "that intervention is never appropriate when the false desire is for suicide. ''4 We can interfere to prevent a person's actions if he was about "to do what was not for