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Sufficient conditions for Nash implementation

✍ Scribed by Steven R. Williams


Book ID
106262768
Publisher
Elsevier Science
Year
2001
Tongue
English
Weight
126 KB
Volume
6
Category
Article
ISSN
1434-4750

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πŸ“œ SIMILAR VOLUMES


On the necessary and sufficient conditio
✍ Tomas SjΓΆstrΓΆm πŸ“‚ Article πŸ“… 1991 πŸ› Springer 🌐 English βš– 502 KB

The purpose of this paper is to provide a constructive way of checking whether or not a social choice correspondence can be implemented in Nash equilibria. The results apply when there are two or more players. The usefulness of this constructive approach is illustrated for the case of single-peaked