It is shown that there are at least two evolutionarily stable strategies, or ESSs, in the war of attrition with a role asymmetry when players make an error with a small but positive probability in implementing their strategy choices. This result proves Maynard Smith's original conjecture that player
β¦ LIBER β¦
Strong evolutionary equilibrium and the war of attrition
β Scribed by John G. Riley
- Book ID
- 107823427
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 1980
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 849 KB
- Volume
- 82
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0022-5193
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
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