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Strong equilibria in claim games corresponding to convex games

✍ Scribed by Ana Meca-Martínez; J. Sánchez-Soriano; I. García-Jurando; Stef Tijs

Publisher
Springer-Verlag
Year
1998
Tongue
English
Weight
139 KB
Volume
27
Category
Article
ISSN
0020-7276

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