## Abstract A mixed duopoly setting is examined where a private nonβprofit firm (NPO) competes with a private profitβmaximizer. The NPO's stakeholders select a contract for their managers. A novel NPO objective function is utilized which takes into account all the likely returns to the NPO's stakeh
β¦ LIBER β¦
Strategic managerial incentives in a two-period Cournot duopoly
β Scribed by Sudesh Mujumdar; Debashis Pal
- Book ID
- 116505779
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 2007
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 262 KB
- Volume
- 58
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0899-8256
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
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