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Strategic entry deterrence and terrorism: Theory

✍ Scribed by John Cadigan; Pamela M. Schmitt

Publisher: Springer US
Year: 2009
Tongue: English
Weight: 418 KB
Volume: 143
Category: Article
ISSN: 0048-5829
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-009-9488-x

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