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Strategic entry deterrence and terrorism: Theory

โœ Scribed by John Cadigan; Pamela M. Schmitt


Publisher
Springer US
Year
2009
Tongue
English
Weight
418 KB
Volume
143
Category
Article
ISSN
0048-5829

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This paper demonstrates that a perverse kind of entry deterrence can result when government subsidized production is combined with non-price rationing in the form of queuing. Even though queuing leads to a total cost to the consumer (not including the tax cost) that is higher than the cost of an uns