Treaties to limit strategic arms, such as those resulting from the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), are generally viewed as resulting in a reduced level of military spending and an increased level of security for both countries. This paper shows that such treaties generally would accelerate the qualitative arms race and could lead to the introduction of new and potentially destabilizing weapon systems. Thus, the result might be an increase in military spending and a decrease in the level of security for both countries. This result is supported by a formal model of bureaucratic decision making, in which defense bureaus choose between purchases of existing weapons systems or research and development expenditures on new weapons systems. The formal model leads to two theorems which identify the conditions under which arms limitation treaties lead to innovations in weapons technology and to increased military spending.
I. SALT and the Qualitative Arms Races
Since the idea of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) was initiated by President Johnson in 1968, there has been an optimistic belief in both the governmental and scientific communities that the ensuing treaties to limit strategic arms would result in both a reduction in the level of military spending and an increase in the level of security. This paper argues that such treaties lead to incentives to develop new weapons systems, and that the *Support of the National Science Foundation, in the form of collaborative research g~ants on "Behavioral and Economic Foundation of Arms Races," is g~atefully acknowledged.