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Stochastic evolutionary stability in extensive form games of perfect information

✍ Scribed by Christoph Kuzmics

Book ID: 116505587
Publisher: Elsevier Science
Year: 2004
Tongue: English
Weight: 245 KB
Volume: 48
Category: Article
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2003.10.001

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