Stability of voting games

✍ Scribed by Shuhe Li

• Publisher: Springer
• Year: 1993
• Tongue: English
• Weight: 265 KB
• Volume: 10
• Category: Article
• ISSN: 0176-1714
• DOI: 10.1007/bf00187432

✦ Synopsis

This paper generalizes the result of Le Breton and Salles (1990) about stable set (far-sighted core of order 1) for voting games to far-sighted core of arbitrary order. Let m be the number of alternatives, n be the number of voters and G (n, k) be a proper symmetric simple game in which the size of a winning coalition is greater or equal to k. It is shown that the far-sighted core of order d for G(n, k) is nonempty for all preference profiles and for all n and k with Fn/ ( n -k ) 7 = v 1 i f f m _ < ( d ÷ 1 ) ( v -1).