𝔖 Bobbio Scriptorium
✦   LIBER   ✦

Spatial and Density Effects in Evolutionary Game Theory

✍ Scribed by R. Cressman; G.T. Vickers

Publisher
Elsevier Science
Year
1997
Tongue
English
Weight
365 KB
Volume
184
Category
Article
ISSN
0022-5193

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

✦ Synopsis

Two models are considered for the study of game dynamics in a spatial domain. Both models are continuous in space and time and give rise to reaction-diffusion equations. The spatial domain is homogeneous but the mobility of the individuals is allowed to depend upon the strategy. The models are analysed for spatial patterns (via a Turing instability) and also for the direction of the travelling wave that replaces one strategy by another. It is shown that the qualitative behaviour of the two models is quite different. When considering the existence of spatial patterns and deciding whether increased mobility is helpful or not, it is shown that the answers depend crucially upon the model equations. Since both models (in the absence of spatial variation) are quite standard, it is clear that considerable care has to be exercised in the formulation of spatial models and in their interpretation.

πŸ“œ SIMILAR VOLUMES

Self-organized Criticality in Spatial Ev
Self-organized Criticality in Spatial Evolutionary Game Theory
✍ Timothy Killingback; Michael Doebeli πŸ“‚ Article πŸ“… 1998 πŸ› Elsevier Science 🌐 English βš– 211 KB

Self-organized criticality is an important framework for understanding the emergence of scale-free natural phenomena. Cellular automata provide simple interesting models in which to study self-organized criticality. We consider the dynamics of a new class of cellular automata which are constructed a

Canalization in evolutionary genetics: a
Canalization in evolutionary genetics: a stabilizing theory?
✍ Greg Gibson; GΓΌnter Wagner πŸ“‚ Article πŸ“… 2000 πŸ› John Wiley and Sons 🌐 English βš– 153 KB

The stability of the morphogenetic system is destroyed (rendered labile) due either to variation in environmental factors or to mutation. On the other hand, in the course of evolution stability is reestablished by the continuous action of stabilizing selection. Stabilizing selection produces a stabl

Status in organizations: where evolution
Status in organizations: where evolutionary theory ranks
✍ Deborah A. Waldron πŸ“‚ Article πŸ“… 1998 πŸ› John Wiley and Sons 🌐 English βš– 112 KB

This paper briefly examines status amongst individuals in contemporary workplace organizations from an evolutionary perspective. The core thesis of this paper is that social and cultural explanations for status fail to adequately explain the pervasiveness of status in organizational contexts. An evo

First steps in constructive game theory
First steps in constructive game theory
✍ Douglas S. Bridges πŸ“‚ Article πŸ“… 2004 πŸ› John Wiley and Sons 🌐 English βš– 127 KB

## Abstract The minimax theorem of matrix game theory is examined from a constructive point of view. It is then shown that the existence of solutions for matrix games cannot be proved constructively, but that a 2‐by‐2 game with at most one solution has a constructible solution. (Β© 2004 WILEY‐VCH Ve