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Sophisticated Voting Under the Sequential Voting by Veto1

โœ Scribed by Fany Yuval

Book ID
111539992
Publisher
Springer US
Year
2002
Tongue
English
Weight
148 KB
Volume
53
Category
Article
ISSN
0040-5833

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

๐Ÿ“œ SIMILAR VOLUMES

Sequential voting by veto: Making the Mu
Sequential voting by veto: Making the Mueller-Moulin algorithm more versatile
โœ S. Felsenthal; Moshรฉ Machover ๐Ÿ“‚ Article ๐Ÿ“… 1992 ๐Ÿ› Springer US ๐ŸŒ English โš– 853 KB

This paper shows that a relatively easy algorithm for computing the (unique) outcome of a sophisticated voting procedure called sequential voting by veto (SVV) applies to a more general situation than considered hitherto. According to this procedure a sequence of n voters must select s out of m + s

The condorcet-efficiency of sophisticate
The condorcet-efficiency of sophisticated voting under the plurality and approval procedures
โœ Dan S. Felsenthal; Zeev Maoz; Amnon Rapoport ๐Ÿ“‚ Article ๐Ÿ“… 1990 ๐Ÿ› John Wiley and Sons ๐ŸŒ English โš– 811 KB

All relevant contigencies have been investigated in order to establish the frequency with which a Condorcet winner is elected under the plurality and approval procedures when voters are assumed to act sophisticatedly, and given that: (1) there are three candidates of whom one must be elected; (2) vo