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Some theorems on the core of an n -Game without Side-Payments

✍ Scribed by Billera, Louis J.

Book ID: 118195485
Publisher: Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics
Year: 1970
Tongue: English
Weight: 930 KB
Volume: 18
Category: Article
ISSN: 0036-1399
DOI: 10.1137/0118049

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