✦ LIBER ✦

Solution of the Hotelling’s game in secure strategies

✍ Scribed by Mikhail Iskakov; Alexey Iskakov

Book ID: 116423463
Publisher: Elsevier Science
Year: 2012
Tongue: English
Weight: 476 KB
Volume: 117
Category: Article
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.04.097

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

📜 SIMILAR VOLUMES

Stackelberg Solutions of Differential Ga

Stackelberg Solutions of Differential Games in the Class of Nonanticipative Strategies

✍ Yurii Averboukh, Artem Baklanov 📂 Article 📅 2013 🏛 SP Birkhäuser Verlag Boston 🌐 English ⚖ 338 KB

On finite approximation of a game soluti

On finite approximation of a game solution with mixed strategies

✍ P. Bernhard; J. Shinar 📂 Article 📅 1990 🏛 Elsevier Science 🌐 English ⚖ 267 KB

Stationary and nonstationary strategies

Stationary and nonstationary strategies in Hotelling's model of spatial competition with repeated pricing decisions

✍ Kali P. Rath 📂 Article 📅 1998 🏛 Springer-Verlag 🌐 English ⚖ 120 KB

THE EAST END, THE WEST END, AND KING'S C

THE EAST END, THE WEST END, AND KING'S CROSS: ON CLUSTERING IN THE FOUR-PLAYER HOTELLING GAME

✍ Steffen Huck; Wieland Müller; Nicolaas J. Vriend 📂 Article 📅 2002 🏛 Oxford University Press 🌐 English ⚖ 216 KB

Evolution of Strategies in the three-per

Evolution of Strategies in the three-person Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Game

✍ Masanao Matsushima; Takashi Ikegami 📂 Article 📅 1998 🏛 Elsevier Science 🌐 English ⚖ 287 KB

A three-person iterated prisoner's dilemma (3p-IPD) game is studied. The present simulation uses a lattice model of finite state automata. In particular, the similarity between a noisy 2pand a noiseless 3p-IPD game is discussed. It is known that, due to the noise, Tit for Tat loses its robustness an

Paradox Lost: The Evolution of Strategie

Paradox Lost: The Evolution of Strategies in Selten’s Chain Store Game

✍ Tracy, William M. 📂 Article 📅 2013 🏛 Springer US 🌐 English ⚖ 507 KB