Socratic Wisdom: The Model of Knowledge in Plato's Early Dialogues

✍ Scribed by Hugh H. Benson

• Publisher: Oxford University Press
• Year: 2000
• Tongue: English
• Leaves: 292
• Edition: 1
• Category: Library

✦ Synopsis

While the early Platonic dialogues have often been explored and appreciated for their ethical content, this is the first book devoted solely to the epistemology of Plato's early dialogues. Author Hugh H. Benson argues that the characteristic features of these dialogues--Socrates' method of questions and answers (elenchos), his fascination with definition, his professions of ignorance, and his thesis that virtue is knowledge--are decidedly epistemological. In this thoughtful study, Benson uncovers the model of knowledge that underlies these distinctively Socratic views. What emerges is unfamiliar, yet closer to a contemporary conception of scientific understanding than ordinary knowledge.

✦ Table of Contents

Socratic Wisdom
PREFACE
CONTENTS
1— Introduction: Socrates, the Epistemologist
1.1— Socrates Is No Epistemologist
1.2— Socrates Who?
1.3— The Structure of the Examination
PART I— THE SOCRATIC ELENCHOS
2— The Aims of the Elenchos
2.1— Introduction
2.2— A Variety of Aims in the Apology
2.2.1— The Delphic Oracle
2.2.2— Socrates' Divine Mission
2.3— The Structure of Aims
2.4— A Case Study: The Laches
2.5— The Other Early Dialogues
2.5.1— Socratic Testing of the Individual's Claim to Wisdom
2.5.2— The More Remote Aims
2.6— The Apparent Failure of the Early Dialogues
2.7— Conclusion
3— The Problem of the Elenchos
3.1— Introduction
3.2— The Problem of the Socratic Elenchos
3.3— The Sufficiency Condition
3.3.1— The Argument from the Methodological Remarks
3.3.2— The Argument from the Socraticaim of Eliminating Conceit
3.3.3— The Argument from Socrates' Actual Premises
3.3.4— Two Kinds of Elenchoi
3.4— The Problem Cannot Be Solved
3.5— Conclusion
4— The Dissolution of the Problem of the Elenchos
4.1— Introduction
4.2— The Elenchoi in the Euthyphro
(E1) The First Elenchos
(E2) The Second Elenchos
(E3) The Third Elenchos
(E4) The Fourth Elenchos
(E5) The Fifth Elenchos
4.3— The Elenchoi in the Laches
(L1) The First Elenchos
(L2) The Second and (L3) Third Elenchoi
(L4) The Fourth Elenchos
4.4— The Elenchoi in the Charmides
(C1) The First and (C2) the Second Elenchoi
(C3) The Third Elenchos
(C4) The Fourth Elenchos
(C5) The Fifth Elenchos
(C6) The Sixth and (C7) the Seventh Elenchoi
(C8) The Eighth Elenchos
4.5— Summary of the Results
4.6— The Objection from Textual Fidelity: The Gorgias
4.7— Philosophical Objections: Eristic and Dogmatism
4.7.1— Eristic120
4.7.2— Dogmatism
4.8— Epistemological Implications
4.8.1— The Knowledge/True Belief Distinction
4.8.2— Knowledge Entails Consistent Beliefs
PART II— SOCRATIC DEFINITION
5— The 'What Is F-Ness?': Question and Socratic Definition
5.1— Introduction
5.2— Some Inadequate Answers to the 'What Is F-Ness?' Question
5.3— Formal Adequacy
5.4— The Matrix
5.4.1— The Coextensive Condition
5.4.2— The Explanatory Condition
5.4.3— The Semantic Conditions
5.5— Conclusion
6— The Priority of Definitional Knowledge
6.1— Introduction
6.2— The Principle
6.3— Two Passages from the Hippias Major
6.4— Two Passages from the Meno
6.5— Some Passages from the Euthyphro
6.6— Two Passages from the Laches
6.7— Taking Stock
6.8— The Argument for Thesis 2
6.9— The Aims of the Elenchos Again
6.10— The Necessity of Knowledge
6.11— Conclusion
7— The Sufficiency of Definitional Knowledge
7.1— Introduction
7.2— The Principle
7.3— Two Central Passages
7.3.1— Euthyphro 6e3–6
7.3.2— Protagoras 360e8–361a3
7.4— The Infallibility of Definitional Knowledge
7.4.1— Infallibility27
7.4.2— Expertise as Definitional Knowledge
7.4.3— Socratic Intellectualism
7.5— The Two Principles Together
7.6— Epistemological Implications
7.6.1— Appropriately Related Beliefs and Consistency
7.6.2— Justified True Belief and Socratic Knowledge
PART III— SOCRATIC KNOWLEDGE
8— Socratic Ignorance
8.1— Introduction
8.2— The Delphic Oracle Story Again
8.3— Definitional Ignorance
8.4— Other Professions of Ignorance
8.5— Socrates' Disclaimer of Teaching
8.6— Socrates the Skeptic
8.6.1— The Irony Interpretation47
8.6.2— The Possibility of Knowledge
8.6.3— The Scope of Socratic Ignorance
8.7— Conclusion
9— A Socratic Theory of Knowledge
9.1— Introduction
9.2— A Summary of the Data
9.3— Knowledge as a Dunamis
9.3.1— Knowledge as a Kind of Dunamis
9.3.2— Socratic Dynamic Theory32
9.3.3— The Dunamis of Knowledge
9.4— The Significance of the Analysis
9.4.1— Understanding
9.4.2— Socrates' Epistemological Milieu
9.5— Conclusion
10— Knowledge, Virtue, and Other Problems
10.1— Introduction
10.2— Socrates the Knower
10.2.1— Introduction
10.2.2— The Texts
10.2.3— The Challenge
10.2.4— The Clutter
10.2.5— The Exceptional Nature of These Passages
10.2.6— Elenctic Versus Certain Knowledge
10.2.7— Knowledge That and Knowledge How
10.2.8— Conclusion
10.3— Socrates the Virtuous Man
10.3.1— Introduction
10.3.2— The Challenge
10.3.3— The Texts for (SV)
10.3.4— Socrates' Involuntary Wrongdoing
10.3.5— Socrates Is Better Than Others
10.3.6— Socrates' Practice of the Political Expertise
10.3.7— Conclusion
10.4— Some Philosophical Problems
10.4.1— Introduction
10.4.2— The Challenges
10.4.3— Plato's Form of the Good
10.4.4— Aristotle's Autonomous Sciences
10.4.5— Conclusion
11— Conclusion: Meno, the Slave-Boy, and Plato
11.1— Introduction
11.2— The Conversation with the Slave-Boy
11.3— The Impetus for the Theory of Recollection
11.4— The Transition to Plato
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INDEX
A
B
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D
E
F
G
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I
J
K
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M
O
P
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T
U
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Z