Abstract
Both the Swiss and the Japanese welfare states are difficult to classify in any one of the most widespread typologies, as each of the two countries combines features that are typical of the liberal model, such as a large private sector role in the delivery of welfare, with aspects that are more reminiscent of the conservative model. These include a social insurance system geared toward status preservation and low employment rates for mothers. In this article, Japan and Switzerland are characterised as liberal conservative welfare states. After pointing out the key features of this hybrid welfare state model, the article puts forward some hypothesis with regard to the reform trajectory that this model is likely to follow. In particular, it is argued that retrenchment in these two countries is likely to be more substantial than in conservative welfare states, because the private schemes that are going to be curtailed are less accountable to public scrutiny and do not automatically expose retrenchment‐oriented governments to the risk of electoral punishment. The hypothesis is only partially confirmed by the empirical analysis of reform, as Swiss direct democracy institutions are proving a formidable obstacle to a generalised dismantling of welfare programmes. In Japan, uncovered needs resulting from retrenchment and social change are being picked up by families.