Social choice theory without Pareto: The pivotal voter approach

✍ Scribed by Michael K. Miller

• Publisher: Elsevier Science
• Year: 2009
• Tongue: English
• Weight: 348 KB
• Volume: 58
• Category: Article
• ISSN: 0165-4896
• DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2009.02.003

✦ Synopsis

Strategy-proofness and pivotal voters: A direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem. International Economic Review 24, 413-7] to all social welfare functions satisfying independence of irrelevant alternatives. Arrow's Theorem, Wilson's Theorem, and the Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem are all immediate corollaries of the main result. It is further shown that a vanishingly small fraction of pairs of alternatives can be affected in the group preference ordering by multiple individuals, which generalizes each of the above theorems.