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Social choice theory without Pareto: The pivotal voter approach

โœ Scribed by Michael K. Miller


Publisher
Elsevier Science
Year
2009
Tongue
English
Weight
348 KB
Volume
58
Category
Article
ISSN
0165-4896

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โœฆ Synopsis


Strategy-proofness and pivotal voters: A direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem. International Economic Review 24, 413-7] to all social welfare functions satisfying independence of irrelevant alternatives. Arrow's Theorem, Wilson's Theorem, and the Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem are all immediate corollaries of the main result. It is further shown that a vanishingly small fraction of pairs of alternatives can be affected in the group preference ordering by multiple individuals, which generalizes each of the above theorems.


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