Sextus Empiricus

✍ Scribed by Richard Bett

• Publisher: Cambridge University Press
• Year: 2012
• Tongue: English
• Leaves: 214
• Edition: New
• Category: Library

✦ Synopsis

Sextus Empiricus' Against the Physicists examines numerous topics central to ancient Greek inquiries into the nature of the physical world, covering subjects such as god, cause and effect, whole and part, bodies, place, motion, time, number, coming into being and perishing and is the most extensive surviving treatment of these topics by an ancient Greek sceptic. Sextus scrutinizes the theories of non-sceptical thinkers, and generates suspension of judgement through the assembly of equally powerful opposing arguments. Richard Bett's edition provides crucial background information about the text and elucidation of difficult passages. His accurate and readable translation is supported by substantial interpretative aids, including a glossary and a list of parallel passages relating Against the Physicists to other works by Sextus. This is an indispensable edition for advanced students and scholars studying this important work by an influential philosopher.

✦ Table of Contents

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS
Title
Copyright
Contents
Abbreviations
Introduction
I LIFE AND WORKS
II THE CHARACTER OF SEXTUS’ SCEPTICISM
III THE CHARACTER OF AGAINST THE PHYSICISTS
IV AGAINST THE PHYSICISTS IN RELATION TO SEXTUS’ OTHER WORKS AND TO EARLIER SOURCES
A Against the Physicists and M 1–6
B Sextus’ use of earlier sources
C Against the Physicists and PH
Note on the text and translation
Outline of argument
Book 1
A. Introduction to the entire work (1–12)
B. God (13–194)
C. Cause and what is affected (195–330)
D. Whole and part (331–58)
E. Distinction between believers in corporeal and incorporeal elements; proposal to tackle them one by one (359–66)
F. Body (366–439)
G. Transition to the subject of incorporeals (440)
Book 2
A. Place (1–36)
B. Motion (37–168)
C. Time (169–247)
D. Number (248–309)
E. Coming into being and perishing (310–50)
F. Conclusion and transition to ethics (351)
Against the Physicists
Book 1
A. INTRODUCTION TO THE ENTIRE WORK (1–12)
1. Focus on principles (1–3)
2. General distinction between active and material principles (4–12)
ON GODS
B. God (13–194)
1. Introduction (13)
2. On the origins of our conception of god (14–48)
a. Dogmatic philosophers’ views on the subject (14–28)
b. Objections to these views (29–47)
c. Conclusion and transition to the question of the gods’ existence (48)
WHETHER THERE ARE GODS
3. On the existence or non-existence of gods (49–193)
a. Introduction (49)
b. Survey of opposing positions: positive, negative and suspensive (50–9)
c. Transition to arguments for the positive and negative positions (59)
d. Arguments for the existence of gods (60–136)
i. Introduction (60)
ii. Arguments “from the agreement among all humans” (61–74)
iii. Transition to the next argument (74–5)
iv. Arguments from design (75–122)
v. Transition to the next argument (122–3)
vi. Arguments “from the absurdities that follow for those who do away with the divine” (123–32)
vii. Argument fitting the description of the fourth and last type introduced in 60 – “from the refutation of opposing arguments” – but not announced as such (133–6)
e. Transition to arguments against the existence of gods (137)
f. Arguments against the existence of gods (138–90)
i. Arguments based on the Stoic supposition that god is a live organism (138–47)
ii. Arguments from the impossibility of either of two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive alternatives (148–51)
iii. Arguments based on the supposition that god is entirely virtuous (152–70)
iv. Further conundrums surrounding god’s virtue or lack of it (171–7)
v. Further arguments of type (ii) above (cf. 148) (178–81)
vi. Sorites arguments from Carneades (182–90)
g. Conclusion to arguments for and against the existence of god (191)
h. The sceptical outcome (191–3)
4. Conclusion to the section on god and transition to the section on cause (194)
ON CAUSE AND WHAT IS AFFECTED
C. CAUSE AND WHAT IS AFFECTED (195–330)
1. Introduction to the subject of cause (195–6)
2. Arguments for the existence of cause (196–206)
3. Arguments against the existence of cause (207–57)
a. Argument from the relativity of cause (207–9)
b. Arguments from the impossibility of causation involving any combination of bodily or incorporeal items (210–26)
c. Further arguments from the impossibility of any member of various sets of mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive alternatives (227–48)
i. Causation among things at rest or in motion (227–31)
ii. Causation among simultaneous, earlier or later things (232–6)
iii. Causation as operating self-sufficiently or with the aid of the affected matter (237–45)
iv. Causes as having one active power or many (246–8)
d. Dogmatic objection and Sextus’ reply (249–51)
e. Further argument of type (c) (cf. 227): causes as separate from or together with the affected matter (252–7)
4. Arguments jointly against the existence of anything either active or affected, based on the impossibility of touch (258–66)
5. Further argument specifically against the existence of anything affected (267–76)
6. Introduction to the subject of subtraction and addition (and change), and its relevance to the question whether anything is affected (277–80)
7. Arguments against subtraction (280–320)
a. Argument from the impossibility of subtraction involving any combination of bodily or incorporeal items (280–307)
b. Argument from the impossibility of subtraction involving any combination of whole or part (308–20)
8. Arguments against addition (321–7)
9. Conclusion on subtraction and addition (plus change, understood in terms of them), and reminder of their relevance to whether anything is affected (328–9)
10. Transition to the section on whole and part (330)
ON WHOLE AND PART
D. WHOLE AND PART (331–58)
1. Preliminary issues about different philosophers’ conceptions of whole and part (331–8)
2. Argument that the whole cannot be either distinct from its parts or identical with the totality of them (338–51)
3. Dogmatic objections, and responses to them (352–7)
4. Conclusion and transition (358)
ON BODY
E. DISTINCTION BETWEEN BELIEVERS IN CORPOREAL AND INCORPOREAL ELEMENTS; PROPOSAL TO TACKLE THEM ONE BY ONE (359–66)
F. BODY (366–439)
1. Arguments against body stemming from its conception (366–436)
a. A conception of body that is vulnerable to earlier arguments (366)
b. Mathematicians’ conception of body, and some initial impasses to which they lead (367–75)
c. Arguments for the non-existence of length (or breadth or depth), in terms of which body is conceived (375–429)
i. Introduction
ii. Argument from the non-existence of a “partless sign,” i.e., point (376–9)
iii. Argument from the impossibility of generating a line out of one or more partless signs (380–9)
iv. Arguments from the inconceivability of the line as a “breadthless length” (390–402)
v. Objections and responses to them (403–13)
vi. Further argument against conceiving of the line as a breadthless length, if it is also the limit of a surface (414–17)
vii. Transition to arguments based on the geometers’ own views (418–19)
viii. Further arguments against conceiving of the line as a breadthless length, based on the idea of the line as describing a circle when rotated (419–28)
ix. Related arguments, based on the geometers’ claims about other geometrical figures (428–9)
d. Argument against body based on the concept of a surface as the limit of a body (430–6)
2. Argument against body on the basis that it can be neither perceptible nor intelligible (437–9)
G. TRANSITION TO THE SUBJECT OF INCORPOREALS (440)
Book 2
A. PLACE (1–36)
1. Concepts of place and their relation to neighboring concepts (1–5)
WHETHER THERE IS PLACE
2. Transition to the opposing arguments (6)
3. Arguments in favor of the existence of place (7–12)
4. Initial argument for their inconclusiveness (13–19)
5. Arguments against the existence of place (20–9)
6. An Aristotelian objection, and response to it (30–6)
7. Transition to the subject of motion (36)
WHETHER THERE IS MOTION
B. MOTION (37–168)
1. Introduction: decision to focus on “transitional” motion (37–44)
2. Three possible positions on motion:
3. Objections against motion based on its conception, and a verdict on who is vulnerable to them (50–61)
4. Initial observation that the positive and negative positions are of equal strength, regardless of the outcome of the previous arguments (61–5)
5. The positive side:
6. Arguments against motion (70–168)
a. Argument that a thing in motion would have to be moved either by itself or by something else, but neither is possible (70–84)
b. Diodorus Cronus’ arguments against motion (85–120)
i. Diodorus’ basic argument (85–90)
ii. Objections to Diodorus (90–6)
iii. Replies to the objections, by Diodorus or on behalf of him, interspersed in some cases with counter-responses (97–111)
iv. Additional, “more sophistic” arguments of Diodorus (112–17)
v. Rejection of these arguments; recommendation to stick with what is in effect a version of the basic argument in (i) (cf. 85) (118–20)
c. Arguments concerning divisibility (121–68)
i. Introduction: the three components of motion and the options concerning their divisibility (121–2)
ii. Arguments against the Stoic position that all three components are infinitely divisible (123–41)
iii. Transition to the Epicurean position that all three are, at a basic level, indivisible (142)
iv. Arguments against the Epicurean position (143–54)
v. Arguments against the intermediate position (attributed to Strato) that some of them are infinitely divisible and some are not (155–67)
vi. Conclusion, and the sceptical outcome (168)
WHETHER THERE IS TIME
C. TIME (169–247)
1. Transition from the subject of motion; introduction (169)
2. Conceptions of time, and objections to them (170–88)
3. “Main arguments” against time (189–214)
a. Argument that time is neither limited nor unlimited (189–91)
b. Argument that time is non-existent because composed of non-existents (192)
c. Argument that time is neither divisible nor indivisible (193–6)
d. Arguments from the division of time into past, present and future (197–202)
e. Arguments that time is not imperishable and ungenerated, or perishable and generated, or some of it one and some the other (203–14)
4. Arguments against time “on the basis of its being” (215–47)
a. A variety of positions on the nature of time (215–28)
b. Objections to these positions (229–47)
5. Conclusion and transition (247)
4. ON NUMBER108
D. NUMBER (248–309)
1. Introduction (248)
2. The Pythagorean position: numbers are the principles of everything (249–84)
a. General considerations about what a principle must be like, and argument that nothing but the principles of number can meet these criteria (249–262)
b. A threefold distinction of basic kinds (262–8)
c. Argument that these three kinds ultimately relate back to the principles of number (269–75)
d. More on the roles these principles play in the cosmos (276–84)
3. Arguments against the Pythagorean position (284–309)
a. Transition (284)
b. A further element in the Pythagorean view – a distinction between numbers and things numbered – and argument against it (285–90)
c. Additional difficulties stemming from the notion of participation (291–8)
d. Argument that numbers cannot be apprehended either by sense-perception or by thought (299–304)
e. Plato’s difficulty about the causes of number (305–7)
f. Difficulties about the construction of numbers (308–9)
5 . ON COMING INTO BEING AND PERISHING141
E. COMING INTO BEING AND PERISHING (310–50)
1. The centrality of the topic to physics; survey of views on the elements from which the universe came into being (310–18)
2. Transition to arguments against coming into being and perishing (319)
3. Argument against coming into being and perishing based on their dependence on things already dismissed (319–25)
4. Argument against the coming into being of either what is or what is not (326–7)
5. Argument against coming into being out of either one thing or multiple things (328–39)
6. Dogmatists’ appeals to experience, and responses to them (340–3)
7. Argument against perishing parallel to 4 (cf. 326) (344–5)
8. Arguments (indebted to Diodorus Cronus) against there being any time in which coming into being or perishing could take place (346–50)
F. CONCLUSION AND TRANSITION TO ETHICS (351)
Glossary
I. ENGLISH-GREEK
2. GREEK-ENGLISH
Persons referred to in Against the Physicists
Parallels between Against the Physicists and other works of Sextus
Bibliography
Index