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Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games

✍ Scribed by Geir B. Asheim; Andrés Perea

Book ID: 116505646
Publisher: Elsevier Science
Year: 2005
Tongue: English
Weight: 251 KB
Volume: 53
Category: Article
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2004.06.015

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