social conditions likely to appear in our civilization the very psychological and social make-up of human beings bodes well for the practice of science. For Hull's mechanism does not make scientists into any more than the flesh-and-blood human beings that they are, while telling us that, precisely because human beings are as they are, conceptual inclusive fitness and the demic structure of science will work to keep science honest. I do not buy everything that Hull has to say on this point, but I think that his valuable contribution is more than a step in the right direction.
I would like to close with two small points. The first is that the adaptability of science of which I have spoken ought to be ascribed not to individual scientific ideas, but rather to our capacity for science itself. Most scientific ideas have of themselves little practical utility, but they play a part in an enterprise which as a whole permits us to deal with the world in a manner that can have great utility (Munevar 1981, Ch. 4). The second point is this. I have rejected some of Hull's proposals, his analysis of selection, for example. And I have placed some of his proposals within a context more amenable to my own view of things. To manage this last I have given a sketch of my own biological epistemology, without elaboration or defense. In that sketch I have made reference to the crucial role of curiosity, a role that I have tried to explain. By not taking curiosity for granted, as Hull does, I think that some important aspects of the nature of science come to light. Now, there are two human drives that Hull takes for granted: the scientists' curiosity and their desire for credit for their contributions to science (p. 154). In my own work I have placed great emphasis on explaining the first of those characteristics of scientists. As for the second, I would like to suggest a very tentative hypothesis. In my view (Munevar 1981, Ch. 4, and in a forthcoming book, The Dimming of Starlight, Ch. 3), I give an account of science as play; and I suspect that if we consider science in that light, it may be easier to understand why desire for credit, so prevalent in other forms of play, could achieve a significant role in the practice of science. Of course, desire for credit is present in many human activities, but Hull needs it to be in science more than in most others.