<p>The Cambridge International Workshop on Security Protocols has now run for eight years. Each year we set a theme, focusing upon a speci?c aspect of security protocols, and invite position papers. Anybody is welcome to send us a position paper (yes, you are invited) and we donβt insist they relate
Security Protocols: 8th International Workshop Cambridge, UK, April 3β5, 2000 Revised Papers
β Scribed by Roger Needham (auth.), Bruce Christianson, James A. Malcolm, Bruno Crispo, Michael Roe (eds.)
- Publisher
- Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
- Year
- 2001
- Tongue
- English
- Leaves
- 265
- Series
- Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2133
- Edition
- 1
- Category
- Library
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
β¦ Synopsis
The Cambridge International Workshop on Security Protocols has now run for eight years. Each year we set a theme, focusing upon a speci?c aspect of security protocols, and invite position papers. Anybody is welcome to send us a position paper (yes, you are invited) and we donβt insist they relate to the current theme in an obvious way. In our experience, the emergence of the theme as a unifying threadtakesplaceduringthediscussionsattheworkshopitself.Theonlyground rule is that position papers should formulate an approach to some unresolved issues, rather than being a description of a ?nished piece of work. Whentheparticipantsmeet,wetrytofocusthediscussionsupontheconc- tual issues which emerge. Security protocols link naturally to many other areas of Computer Science, and deep water can be reached very quickly. Afterwards, we invite participants to re-draft their position papers in a way which exposes the emergent issues but leaves open the way to their further development. We also prepare written transcripts of the recorded discussions. These are edited (in some cases very heavily) to illustrate the way in which the di?erent arguments and perspectives have interacted. We publish these proceedings as an invitation to the research community. Although many interesting results ?rst see the light of day in a volume of our proceedings, laying claim to these is not our primary purpose of publication. Rather, we bring our discussions and insights to a wider audience in order to suggest new lines of investigation which the community may fruitfully pursue.
β¦ Table of Contents
Keynote Address: Security Protocols and the Swiss Army Knife....Pages 1-4
Mergers and Principals....Pages 5-13
Mergers and Principals....Pages 14-19
Authentication and Naming....Pages 20-23
Users and Trust in Cyberspace....Pages 24-35
Users and Trust in Cyberspace....Pages 36-42
Interactive Identification Protocols....Pages 43-48
Open Questions....Pages 49-53
Looking on the Bright Side of Black-Box Cryptography....Pages 54-61
Government Access to Keys - Panel Discussion....Pages 62-73
Making Sense of Specifications: The Formalization of SET....Pages 74-81
Making Sense of Specifications: The Formalization of SET....Pages 82-86
Lack of Explicitness Strikes Back....Pages 87-93
Lack of Explicitness Strikes Back....Pages 94-99
Review and Revocation of Access Privileges Distributed with PKI Certificates....Pages 100-112
Review and Revocation of Access Privileges Distributed with PKI Certificates....Pages 113-124
The Correctness of Crypto Transaction Sets....Pages 125-127
The Correctness of Crypto Transaction Sets....Pages 128-141
Micro-management of Risk in a Trust-Based Billing System....Pages 142-154
Broadening the Scope of Fault Tolerance within Secure Services....Pages 155-164
Broadening the Scope of Fault Tolerance within Secure Services....Pages 165-169
DOS-Resistant Authentication with Client Puzzles....Pages 170-177
DOS-Resistant Authentication with Client Puzzles....Pages 178-181
Public-Key Crypto-systems Using Symmetric-Key Crypto-algorithms....Pages 182-183
Public-Key Crypto-systems Using Symmetric-Key Crypto-algorithms....Pages 184-193
Denial of Service β Panel Discussion....Pages 194-203
The Resurrecting Duckling β What Next?....Pages 204-214
The Resurrecting Duckling β What Next?....Pages 215-222
An Anonymous Auction Protocol Using βMoney Escrowβ....Pages 223-233
Short Certification of Secure RSA Modulus....Pages 234-237
Authenticating Web-Based Virtual Shops Using Signature-Embedded Marks β A Practical Analysis β....Pages 238-248
Authentication Web-Based Virtual Shops Using Signature-Embedded Marks β A Practical Analysis β....Pages 249-252
I Cannot Tell a Lie....Pages 253-255
Afterward....Pages 256-256
β¦ Subjects
Data Encryption; Algorithm Analysis and Problem Complexity; Computer Communication Networks; Management of Computing and Information Systems; Business Information Systems
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