โ Scribed by Heinz J. Skala
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
for providing the ideal conditions for the workshop, and to Professor John C. Harsanyi who presided over it.
The papers centered essentially around three main fields of current research which certainly cannot be distinctly separated:
(1) Games with a continuum of players and economic models with a continuum of participants; (2) (Repeated) games with incomplete information;
(3) Solution concepts for n-person games. Listed below are the papers: JAMES CASE 'Differential Games' JOHN C. HARSANYI REINHARD SELTEN 'A Solution Concept Unifying the Theories of Cooperative and Non-cooperative Games' KARL VIND 'Fair Net Trades' WERNER HILDENBRAND 'Survey: Measure Spaces of Economic Agents' ROBERT J. AUMANN JOHN C. HARSANYI 'Games with Incomplete Information' JOHN P. MAYBERRY ROBERT M. THRALL 'Discussion of Applications of Game Theory' Theory and Decision 2 (1972) 403--406. All Rights Reserved Copyright 9 1972 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland 'On the Approximation of a Nash Equilibrium Point in an n-Person Non-cooperative Game' YAKAR KANNAI 'Cores of Games and Economies with Infinitely Many Participants' BENYAMIN SHITOVITZ 'Oligopolies in a Market with a Continuum of Traders' REINHARD SELTEN 'Equal-Share Analysis of Characteristic-Function Game Experiments' BIRGIT GRODAL 'Approximation of Convex Preferences by Strongly Convex Preferences' REINHARD SELTEN 'Games with Incomplete Information' DAVID SCHMEIDLER 'On Correspondences' SHMUEL ZAMIR 'Games with Incomplete Information' Kr~NETH ARROW 'Optimal Growth with Non-neutral Technological Change' (Joint Seminar with the Stanford-Berkeley Workshop on Economic Behavior under Uncertainty) ROBERT J. AUMANN 'Shapley Values of Games with a Continuum of Players' KENNETH ARROW 'The Core and the Competitive Economy: an Elementary Treatment'
๐ SIMILAR VOLUMES