๐”– Bobbio Scriptorium
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Scoring Rules, Condorcet Efficiency and Social Homogeneity

โœ Scribed by Dominique Lepelley; Patrick Pierron; Fabrice Valognes


Book ID
110221893
Publisher
Springer US
Year
2000
Tongue
English
Weight
102 KB
Volume
49
Category
Article
ISSN
0040-5833

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.


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Social homogeneity and Condorcet's parad
โœ Peter C. Fishburn; William V. Gehrlein ๐Ÿ“‚ Article ๐Ÿ“… 1980 ๐Ÿ› Springer US ๐ŸŒ English โš– 744 KB

An electron among rn ~> 3 candidates has a Condorcet winner if some candidate can defeat (or tie) every other candidate under pairwise majority voting. The election of a Condorcet winner is appealing for several reasons, including its adherence to the principle of selection according to the will of