Saul Kripke

✍ Scribed by Alan Berger

• Publisher: Cambridge University Press
• Year: 2011
• Tongue: English
• Leaves: 383
• Edition: 1
• Category: Library

✦ Synopsis

This collection of essays on Saul Kripke and his philosophy is the first and only collection of essays to examine both published and unpublished writings by Kripke. Its essays, written by distinguished philosophers in the field, present a broader picture of Kripke's life and work than has previously been available to scholars of his thought. New topics covered in these essays include vacuous names and names in fiction, Kripke on logicism and de re attitude toward numbers, Kripke on the incoherency of adopting a logic, Kripke on color words and his criticism of the primary versus secondary quality distinction, and Kripke's critique of functionalism. These essays not only present Kripke's basic arguments but also engage with the arguments and controversies engendered by his work, providing the most comprehensive analysis of his philosophy and writings available. This collection will become a classic in contemporary analytic philosophy.

✦ Table of Contents

Saul Kripke......Page 2
Title......Page 4
Copyright......Page 5
Contents......Page 6
List of Contributors......Page 8
Introduction to Kripke Alan Berger......Page 12
PART I NAMING, NECESSITY, AND APRIORITY......Page 26
1 Kripke on Proper and General Names Bernard Linsky......Page 28
1. THE CLUSTER OF DESCRIPTIONS THEORY OF PROPER NAMES......Page 29
2. RIGID DESIGNATORS......Page 34
3. NAMING AND KNOWING......Page 36
4. KRIPKE'S POSITIVE ACCOUNT OF NAMES......Page 37
5. A PRIORI CONTINGENT AND A POSTERIORI NECESSARY TRUTHS......Page 40
6. NAMING KRIPKE'S "THEORY" OF NAMES......Page 44
7. GENERAL NAMES......Page 46
8. SPEAKER'S REFERENCE AND SEMANTIC REFERENCE......Page 54
References......Page 57
I......Page 60
II......Page 68
III......Page 74
IV......Page 77
Propositions......Page 89
ESSENTIALISM AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN EPISTEMIC AND METAPHYSICAL POSSIBILITY......Page 90
THE SCOPE OF KRIPKE'S ESSENTIALIST ROUTE TO THE NECESSARY A POSTERIORI......Page 94
Kripke’s Second (Attempted) Route to the Necessary A Posteriori: Hesperus and Phosphorus......Page 98
Extension of the Argument to Other Instances of the Necessary A Posteriori......Page 100
The Unsoundness of Kripke’s Second Route to the Necessary A Posteriori......Page 103
A FINAL WORD ABOUT STRONG DISQUOTATION AND JUSTIFICATION......Page 108
1. INTRODUCTION......Page 111
2. MODAL REALISM AND REDUCTIVE ANALYSIS......Page 112
3. IDENTIFYING INDIVIDUALS......Page 117
4. MERELY POSSIBLE INDIVIDUALS......Page 121
References......Page 126
PART II FORMAL SEMANTICS, TRUTH, PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS, AND PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC......Page 128
2. WHAT IS A MODEL THEORY?......Page 130
3. WHAT IS A MODAL LOGIC?......Page 132
4. KRIPKE MODELS FOR MODAL SENTENTIAL LOGIC......Page 134
5. SOUNDNESS AND COMPLETENESS......Page 136
6. WARNINGS......Page 137
7. HISTORICAL NOTE......Page 139
8. KRIPEKE MODELS FOR INTUITIONISTIC LOGIC......Page 141
9. KRIPKE MODELS FOR MODAL PREDICATE LOGIC......Page 144
10. THE PROBLEM OF INTERPRETATION......Page 146
References......Page 149
2. LIAR SENTENCES......Page 152
3. TARSKI ON TRUTH......Page 155
4. TRUTH-VALUE GAPS......Page 157
5. JUMPS AND FIXED POINTS......Page 160
6. THE MINIMUM FIXED POINT......Page 161
7. OTHER FIXED POINTS......Page 163
8. KRIPKE VERSUS TARSKI......Page 164
9. GLIMPSES BEYOND......Page 166
References......Page 170
7 Kripke on Logicism, Wittgenstein, and De Re Beliefs about Numbers Mark Steiner......Page 171
Works Cited......Page 187
8 Kripke on the Incoherency of Adopting a Logic Alan Berger......Page 188
I. LOGIC AS A SET OF STATEMENTS AND LOGIC AS A FORMAL SYSTEM......Page 189
Three Applications of the Lewis Carroll Argument to Refute Three Related Claims......Page 192
Replies to Various Applications of the Infinite Regress Argument, Rejoinders to These Replies, and Kripke’s Novel Application of the Infinite Regress Argument......Page 195
Can We Change the Laws of Logic?......Page 197
II. PUTNAM, QUANTUM LOGIC, AND "LOGIC" AS A FORMAL SYSTEM......Page 200
The Situation in Quantum Mechanics that Motivates Putnam’s Proposal......Page 201
Putnam’s Proposal......Page 203
Putnam’s Formal System and Quantum Logic......Page 204
III. INTUITIONIST LOGIC, NEW CONNECTIVES, AND A NEW SUBJECT13......Page 211
Intuitionistic Arithmetic and the Meaning of Intuitionistic Connectives......Page 215
IV. GENERAL MORALS......Page 217
PART III LANGUAGE AND MIND......Page 220
1......Page 222
2......Page 224
3......Page 225
4......Page 228
5......Page 230
6......Page 233
7......Page 235
8......Page 236
9......Page 239
10......Page 242
ABSTRACT......Page 246
I......Page 247
II......Page 252
III......Page 259
IV......Page 262
I. INTRODUCTION......Page 264
II. Nonfactualism and the Skeptical Conclusion......Page 268
III. THE SKEPTICAL SOLUTION AND NONFACTUALISM......Page 279
IV. THE FACTUALISM OF MEANING ASCRIPTIONS IN WITTGENSTEIN......Page 297
1. THE LOCKEAN PRIMARY/SECONDARY QUALITY DISTINCTION AND KRIPKE'S REACTION TO IT......Page 301
2. KRIPKE ON ARGUMENTS FOR DISPOSITIONALISM AND FOR LOCKE'S DIVISION OF THE SENSIBLE QUALITIES......Page 305
3. KRIPKE ON COLOR WORD'S IN NATURAL LANGUAGE......Page 311
Modal Considerations......Page 315
Killer Intensities, Faint Intensities, and Jaundice......Page 316
The Analogy between Yellowness and Solidity......Page 319
Color Illusions......Page 321
Unaltered, Unmasked, Standardly Mediated,and Relativized Dispositions......Page 322
Color Similarities......Page 326
Unrecognizable Conceptually Necessary Truths......Page 329
References......Page 332
PART IV PHILOSOPHY OF MIND AND PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY......Page 336
13 Kripke and Cartesianism Sydney Shoemaker......Page 338
References......Page 353
ABSTRACT......Page 354
INTRODUCTION......Page 355
FUNCTIONALIST CONCEPTIONS OF THE MIND......Page 357
ATTACKING FUNCTIONALISM ON ITS WEAKEST POINTS......Page 359
FINITE-STATE AUTOMATA, TURNING MACHINES, AND COMPUTATIONAL MODELS OF COGNITION......Page 360
KRIPKE'S PROBLEM FOR FUNCTIONALISM......Page 361
THE TRIVIALITY PROBLEM......Page 362
THE ROLES OF IDEALIZATION AND ABSTRACTION IN SPECIFYING FUNTIONAL STATES......Page 363
"THE FALSE CAN ALWAYS BE TURNED INTO THE TRUE BY INVOKING THE APPROPRIATE COUNTERFACTUAL"14......Page 367
THE FALLACY OF SOPHOMORIC RELATIVISM AND WHY FUNCTIONALISM MUST COMMIT IT......Page 369
STABLER'S OBJECTIONS TO KRIPKE'S ANTIFUNCTIONALIST ARGUMENT......Page 373
THE FALLACY IN FUNCTIONALISM......Page 377
Index......Page 380