Half-title
Title
Copyright
Dedication
Contents
Figures
Tables
Preface
1 Rationality
1.1 Games machines play
1.2 Conventional notions
1.2.1 Substantive rationality
1.2.2 Procedural rationality
1.2.3 Bounded rationality
1.3 Middle ground
1.3.1 Adequacy
1.3.2 Sociality
2 Locality
2.1 Localization concepts
2.2 Group rationality
2.3 Conditioning
2.4 Emergence
2.5 Less is more
3 Praxeology
3.1 Dichotomies
3.1.1 Costβbenefit analysis
3.1.2 Epistemic utility theory
3.2 Abduction
3.3 Epistemic games
3.3.1 The information-conservation game
3.3.2 The error-avoidance game
3.3.3 Leviβs epistemic game
3.4 Praxeic utility
3.5 Tie-breaking
3.6 Praxeology versus Bayesianism
4 Equanimity
4.1 Equilibria
4.2 Adequacy
4.3 Consistency
5 Uncertainty
5.1 Bayesian uncertainty
5.2 Imprecision
5.3 Equivocation
5.3.1 Attitude
Tension
5.4 Quasi-invariance
6 Community
6.1 Joint and individual options
6.2 Interdependency
6.2.1 Mixtures
6.2.2 Conditioning
6.2.3 Spatial emergence
6.3 Satisficing games
6.4 Group preference
6.5 Optimizing versus satisficing
7 Congruency
7.1 Classical negotiation
7.2 Satisficing negotiation
7.2.1 The negotiation theorem
7.2.2 The Resource Sharing game
7.2.3 Intrinsic decisions
7.3 Social welfare
7.3.1 Arrowian social welfare
7.3.2 Satisficing social welfare
8 Complexity
8.1 Game examples
8.1.1 Bluffing
8.1.2 Battle of the Sexes
8.1.3 Prisonerβs Dilemma
8.1.4 The Ultimatum game
8.1.5 The game-theoretic role of social relationships
8.2 Mitigating complexity
Hierarchical
Markovian
8.3 An N-player example
8.3.1 The optimal solution
8.3.2 The satisficing solution
9 Meliority
9.1 Amelioration versus optimization
9.2 Meta-decisions
9.3 Some open questions
9.4 The enterprise of synthesis
Appendix A: Bounded rationality
Appendix B: Game theory basics
Appendix C: Probability theory basics
Appendix D: A logical basis for praxeic reasoning
D.1 Desiderata for coherent evaluation
D.2 Quantitative rules of behavior
D.3 Constructing probability (selectability, rejectability)
Bibliography
Name index
Subject index