In a widely discussed article, 'Mind-Body, identity, Privacy and Categories', 1 Richard Rorty set forth a new approach to the Identity Theory of the Mind. Instead of attempting to equate sensations and certain neural events, Rorty claims that in the future we may cease to speak of sensations at all.
Rorty's disappearance theory
โ Scribed by Steven Savitt
- Publisher
- Springer Netherlands
- Year
- 1975
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 228 KB
- Volume
- 28
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0031-8116
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
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