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Role of Relative Information and Reciprocity in a Gift Exchange Game: An Experimental Study

✍ Scribed by Kean Siang, CH’NG

Book ID
126563920
Publisher
Elsevier
Year
2011
Tongue
English
Weight
255 KB
Volume
41
Category
Article
ISSN
0313-5926

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

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