## Abstract Hospitals are frequently changing managerial practices due to numerous public sector reforms taking place. In general, these reforms include the making and monitoring of contracts that regulate relations between the hospitals and their professional staffs. The aim of this paper is to d
Risk selection and matching in performance-based contracting
โ Scribed by Mingshan Lu; Ching-to Albert Ma; Lasheng Yuan
- Publisher
- John Wiley and Sons
- Year
- 2003
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 170 KB
- Volume
- 12
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 1057-9230
- DOI
- 10.1002/hec.734
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
โฆ Synopsis
Abstract
This paper examines selection and matching incentives of performanceโbased contracting (PBC) in a model of patient heterogeneity, provider horizontal differentiation and asymmetric information. Treatment effectiveness is affected by the match between a patient's illness severity and a provider's treatment intensity. Before PBC, a provider's revenue is unrelated to treatment effectiveness; therefore, providers supply treatments even if their treatment intensities do not match with the patients' severities. Under PBC, budget allocation is positively related to treatment performance; patientโprovider mismatch is reduced because patients are referred more often. Using data from the state of Maine, we show that PBC leads to more referrals and better match between illness severity and treatment intensity. Moreover, we find that PBC has a positive but insignificant effect on dumping. Copyright ยฉ 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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