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Risk aversion and incentive compatibility withex postinformation asymmetry

โœ Scribed by Martin F. Hellwig


Book ID
105742819
Publisher
Springer
Year
2001
Tongue
English
Weight
154 KB
Volume
18
Category
Article
ISSN
0938-2259

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