Revenue non-equivalence between the English and the second-price auctions: experimental evidence
β Scribed by Chew Soo Hong; Naoko Nishimura
- Book ID
- 117350044
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 2003
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 219 KB
- Volume
- 51
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0167-2681
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π SIMILAR VOLUMES
Bidding the same price in descending bid auctions and in first price sealed bid auctions is equivalent to expected utility maximizing behavior, and this is equivalent to dynamically consistent bidding. The claim that, in strategic form, descending bid and first price sealed bid auctions are the same
## Abstract Demand reduction in Uniformβprice and English auctions are strategic reactions by participants to reduce price and thus increase potential profits. Laboratory experiments similar to the field experiments performed by List and Reiley (__Am. Econ. Rev__. 2000; **9**(4): 961β972) in which
LETTERS TO THE EDITORS 557 involving NH3 are rapid enough to allow a redox cycle of the catalyst. In related experimene~ 6 on the reaction with oxygen of a representative organic binder molecrle, such as propylene, the copper chromite catalyst was found to be most etfective in complete oxidation of