Resource rent rivalry in the western pacific tuna fishery: Cooperative and non-cooperative solutions
✍ Scribed by H.F. Campbell
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 1989
- Weight
- 386 KB
- Volume
- 12
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0951-8312
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
✦ Synopsis
A BS TRA CT
The ability of coastal states to extract economic benefit from the management of fish stocks within their Exclusive Economic Zones depends on the structure of the markets for fishing rights and fish products. The countries of the South Pacific Forum have some monopoly power in the allocation of tuna fishing rights, while the distant water fishing nations have some monopsony power in the market for fish products. These countries can exercise their market power in an attempt to maximize their individual economic benefits, or they can cooperate in exploiting the resource. This paper uses a Nash-Cournot model to show that cooperation will yield greater total benefits than non-cooperative exercise of market power.