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Replicator Dynamics of Symmetric Ultimatum Game

✍ Scribed by Jacek Miękisz; Michał Ramsza

Book ID
113109985
Publisher
SP Birkhäuser Verlag Boston
Year
2012
Tongue
English
Weight
390 KB
Volume
2
Category
Article
ISSN
2153-0785

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