The Rand Corporation IhTTRODUCTzON One of the objectives of the Air Force is to allocate its budget to the purchase of weapons1 and to expenditures on their logistics support in a way that maximizes operational capability. The purpose of this paper is to discuss general problems involved in making this kind of decision.
I. OPERATIONAL READINESS AND LOGISTICS
The growing speed and destructiveness of airborne weapons has changed radically the meaning of operational capability from what it used to be in World W a r II. Strategic air power can no longer be measured in terms of a gradual build-up of capacity to deliver, over many months, thousands of sorties against the enemy. Instead, it must be measured in terms of the instantaneous striking power of a limited number of aircraft flying a limited number of sorties. Operational readiness is the overriding criterion.
Similarly, since the United States has become vulnerable to sudden and heavy attack, a strong air defense force, kept in a state of perpetual readiness, is needed. The operational capability of tactical air forces, too, depends on the maintenance of a high degree of alertness and mobility for possible action anywhere on the globe.
With the exception of a prolonged, limited war of the Korean type-perhaps an unlikely thing in the future-the foreseeable conditions of war, peripheral as well as total, defensive as well as offensive, emphasize the value of continued operational readiness for SAC, ADC, and a major part of TAC forces.
From this emphasis on readiness, there flow two simple requirements: a high premium on operationally ready weapons and a high premium on operationally ready crews. It is clear that aircraft not operationally ready because of lack of maintenance would contribute little to the war effort if D-day came tomorrow. They might be lost on their bases, or the war might be decided before they could enter it. Likewise, a lack of operationally ready crews capable of handling the complex new weapons would constrain the operational capability of the Air Force in the critical early stages of the war.
*Manuscript received April 16, 1957 lThe discussion will be centered on aircraft a s major weapons; but the concepts proposed here probably apply equally well to large m i s s i l e s and their logistic support.